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Defining “Foreign Affairs” in Section
702 of the FISA Amendments Act: The
Virtues and Deficits of Post-Snowden
Dialogue on U.S. Surveillance Policy
Peter Margulies*
I. Introduction
The revelations of Edward Snowden about government
intelligence collection and surveillance have spurred a national
conversation about surveillance.1 Both government and civil
* Professor of Law, Roger Williams University School of Law; B.A.,
Colgate, 1978; J.D., Columbia, 1981.
1. See David Cole, Can Privacy Be Saved?, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Mar. 6, 2014,
at 23 (discussing concerns about privacy). See generally Laura K. Donohue,
Section 702 and the Collection of International Telephone and Internet Content,
38 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 117 (2015) (cautioning about risks of foreign
surveillance); Laura K. Donohue, Bulk Metadata Collection: Statutory and
Constitutional Considerations, 37 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 757 (2014) (warning
about risks of domestic surveillance); Shayana Kadidal, NSA Surveillance: The
Implications for Civil Liberties, 10 ISJLP 433 (2014) (same). Cf. Peter Margulies,
Dynamic Surveillance: Evolving Procedures in Metadata and Foreign Content
Collection After Snowden, 66 HASTINGS L.J. 1 (2014) [hereinafter Dynamic
Surveillance] (arguing that pre-Snowden domestic and foreign intelligence
collection were consistent with both U.S. statutes and the Constitution, while
arguing for reforms to enhance legitimacy of such efforts); Ashley Deeks, An
International Legal Framework for Surveillance, 55 VA. J. INT’L L. 291 (2015)
(arguing for procedural norms); Peter Margulies, The NSA in Global Perspective:
Surveillance, Human Rights, and International Counterterrorism, 82 FORDHAM L.
REV. 2137 (2014) [hereinafter NSA in Global Perspective] (arguing that U.S.
surveillance and intelligence collection policy is consistent with international
human rights law, and that reforms would buttress this argument); Peter
Margulies, Rage Against the Machine?: Automated Surveillance and Human
Rights, (Roger Williams Univ. L. Stud. Paper No. 164, 2015), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2657619 (urging safeguards such as independent review
of transnational surveillance).
For case law on various surveillance programs, see In re Directives Pursuant
to Section 105b of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 551 F.3d 1004, 1006
(FISA Ct. Rev. 2008) (upholding predecessor to FAA as constitutional); United
States v. Mohamud, No. 3:10-CR-00475-KI-1, 2014 WL 2866749, at *1, *9–27 (D.
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liberties advocates, although they differ on the cost of Snowden’s
disclosures, agree that this conversation has in some respects been
beneficial. In this brief essay, I examine the virtues and limits of
that conversation, with respect to a particular statutory provision:
the definition of “foreign intelligence information” in § 702 of the
FISA Amendments Act of 2008 (FAA) as including information
with “respect to a foreign power” relating to the “conduct of the
foreign affairs” of the United States.2 The exact parameters of the
surveillance authorized by this language are admittedly unclear.
However, privacy advocates—despite their sincerity—have not
advanced the conversation in their approach to this issue.3 A more
nuanced dialogue is necessary; this essay seeks to further that
process.
While critics have argued that § 702’s “foreign affairs”
provision is a roving license for open-ended intelligence collection,
that position fails to acknowledge the Framers’ view that secrecy
is necessary for deliberation.4 Premature public disclosure of
lawful surveillance and intelligence collection can sour
negotiations and embarrass allies.5 The Framers, who had
practiced diplomacy from the American Revolution through the
Founding Era, prized secrecy as one of the virtues of statecraft.6
Aware that they were pursuing a new legal and political order,
Or. June 24, 2014) (upholding surveillance under § 702); see also Klayman v.
Obama, 2015 U.S. App. Lexis 15189 at *1, *6 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 28, 2015) (vacating
preliminary injunction against § 215 program that had been issued by district
court). But see ACLU v. Clapper, 785 F.3d 787, 813–16 (2d Cir. 2015) (holding
that § 215 program exceeded statutory authority).
2. 50 U.S.C. § 1801(e)(2)(B) (2012).
3. For a useful and dispassionate source of analysis and information on
§ 702 surveillance, see PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BOARD, REPORT
ON THE SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM OPERATED PURSUANT TO SECTION 702 OF THE
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT 93 (2014) [hereinafter PCLOB § 702
REPORT], https://www.pclob.gov/library/702-Report.pdf.
4. See Margulies, Dynamic Surveillance, supra note 1, at 30–33 (discussing
Framers’ views); cf. David E. Pozen, Deep Secrecy, 63 STAN. L. REV. 257, 278, 282–
83, 287 (2010) (noting secrecy’s risks and benefits).
5. See STANLEY ELKINS & ERIC MCKITRICK, THE AGE OF FEDERALISM 348–61
(1993) (discussing reaction of Jefferson and Hamilton during neutrality crisis
with France to tactics of French minister Edmond Genet); JOHN LAMBERTON
HARPER, AMERICAN MACHIAVELLI: ALEXANDER HAMILTON AND THE ORIGINS OF U.S.
FOREIGN POLICY 115–23 (2004) (recounting neutrality crisis).
6. See Margulies, Dynamic Surveillance, supra note 1, at 30–33 (discussing
secrecy in American law).
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they were also determined to revive virtues from the humanist
political tradition that the warring monarchies of Europe had
submerged. Moreover, the Framers understood diplomacy’s place
in international law. The criticism that Founding Era officials such
as Hamilton and Madison, despite their differences, directed at the
French minister Edmond Genet during the Neutrality Crisis
demonstrated their understanding of secrecy’s utility for
diplomacy.7
Properly understood as limited to state conduct, the “foreign
affairs” prong of “foreign intelligence information” under § 702
deals largely with matters ancillary to diplomacy, including
foreign officials’ taking of bribes from private companies, aid to
individuals and entities in the theft of U.S. intellectual property,
and attitudes toward sanctions on rogue states such as Iran.8 The
“foreign affairs” language, understood as its language and intent
suggest, is not a residual clause authorizing all the collection and
surveillance precluded by other definitions in the statute. It simply
allows the United States to gather information relating to other
states’ compliance with norms and the prospects for international
cooperation on enforcement. This U.S. monitoring may occur
clandestinely. As with other forms of information-gathering,
undue disclosure of the means and subject of the collection may
undermine the purpose of the investigation or jeopardize other
U.S. foreign policy goals, such as cooperation with states that the
United States has targeted for investigation.
Privacy advocates who criticize the breadth of the “foreign
affairs” provision in the FAA have generally not recognized its
importance for U.S. diplomacy. This failure to acknowledge the
diplomatic issues addressed by the “foreign affairs” provision has
adversely affected the public debate about surveillance and
intelligence collection. To grapple with the issues raised by the
“foreign affairs” provision, privacy advocates should have
acknowledged the government’s interests. They then should have
argued that those interests are less important than the
government contends or that the government can vindicate those
7. See ELKINS & MCKITRICK, supra note 5, at 348–61 (discussing reaction to
tactics of French minister Edmond Genet during neutrality crisis).
8. See Charlie Savage, Book Reveals Wider Net of U.S. Spying on Envoys,
N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 2014, at A8 (discussing the NSA’s role in the diplomatic
negotiations leading up to Iran sanctions).
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interests in an overall regime of transparency. Instead, privacy
advocates have advanced an oversimplified view of the Framers’
thought that unduly discounts the virtues of secrecy.
One could also view privacy advocates’ stance as a more
sophisticated effort in tune with the Framers’ efforts to fashion
procedural proxies for substantive concerns. Although privacy
advocates have urged a narrowing or clarification of the “foreign
affairs” provision, they have also pushed for procedural reforms
that would add checks and balances to the proceedings of the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC). The USA
FREEDOM Act of 20159 incorporated some of those reforms,
including a panel of amicus curiae that would push back against
the government’s arguments in the FISC.10 These procedural
reforms would act as a proxy for substantive revisions of § 702, by
assuring privacy advocates that a neutral party responsive to the
public’s concerns would monitor intelligence collection and
surveillance. Having robust external constraints in place could
also reinforce the internal compliance culture within the NSA and
other intelligence agencies, and promote faith in technological
safeguards that the NSA and other agencies have installed to
protect privacy. A conversation that resulted in an
institutionalized public advocate and other robust procedural
proxies for substantive reform would protect both privacy and the
United States’ diplomatic imperatives.
This Essay is in three Parts. Part I discusses the FAA’s
“foreign affairs” provision and privacy advocates’ concerns. It also
notes the substantial reforms, including greater transparency,
that U.S. intelligence agencies such as the NSA have promulgated
since the Snowden revelations, in part because of the process
initiated by Presidential Policy Directive No. 28 (PPD-28) in
January 2014.11 Part II discusses views of secrecy and diplomacy
during the Founding Era, centering on the Neutrality Crisis with
France. This section also mentions subsequent judicial decisions
on secrecy and statecraft. Part III argues that privacy advocates’
9. Pub. L. No. 114–23, 129 Stat. 268, § 401 (2015) (codified at various
sections of Title 50 of the U.S. Code).
10. 50 U.S.C. § 1803(i).
11. See Presidential Policy Directive/PPD-28 on Signals Intelligence
Activities, 2014 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 31, at 5 (Jan. 17, 2015) [hereinafter PPD28] (promulgating certain policies for safeguarding personal information).
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failure to acknowledge the need for secrecy in intelligencegathering supporting U.S. diplomacy has adversely affected the
public discussion of surveillance policy. In addition, this section
argues that steering the post-Snowden conversation toward
procedural proxies such as an institutionalized public advocate at
the FISC would enrich public debate.
II. Section 702 and Post-Snowden Reform
Edward Snowden’s revelations have resulted in intense public
scrutiny of two types of intelligence collection by the NSA. One is
domestic—the so-called metadata program, established under
§ 215 of the USA Patriot Act,12 which entails the bulk collection of
call record information, including phone numbers and times of
calls.13 The other is foreign—programs operated pursuant to § 702
of the FAA.14 The discussion in this Part centers on § 702. It then
discusses post-Snowden reforms that are already in place, and
privacy advocates’ arguments that more substantive reform of
§ 702 is necessary.
A. Section 702 and “Foreign Affairs”
Under § 702, the government may conduct surveillance
targeting the contents of communications of non-U.S. persons
reasonably believed to be located abroad when the surveillance will
result in acquiring foreign intelligence information.15 The
12. 50 U.S.C. § 1861 (2012).
13. See Donohue, Bulk Metadata Collection, supra note 1, at 127–28
(explaining § 215); David S. Kris, On the Bulk Collection of Tangible Things, 1
LAWFARE RES. PAPER SERIES, Sept. 29, 2013, at 2–17, http://lawfare.s3-us-west2.amazonaws.com/staging/s3fs-public/uploads/2013/09/Lawfare-Research-PaperSeries-No.-4-2.pdf (discussing the government’s bulk collection practices); Steven
G. Bradbury, Understanding the NSA Programs: Bulk Acquisition of Telephone
Metadata Under Section 215 and Foreign-Targeted Collection Under Section 702,
1 LAWFARE RES. PAPER SERIES, Sept. 1, 2013, at 2–7, http://lawfare.s3-us-west2.amazonaws.com/staging/s3fs-public/uploads/2013/08/Bradbury-Vol-1-No-3.pdf
(explaining bulk collection pursuant to § 215).
14. 50 U.S.C. § 1881a (2012).
15. See id. § 1881a(a) (authorizing certain “targeting of persons reasonably
believed to be located outside the United States to acquire foreign intelligence
information”). Portions of the discussion in this subsection originated in an earlier
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government files a certification with the FISC that details its
targeting procedures, as well as minimization procedures that
reduce the likelihood that analysts will use or retain purely
domestic communications or irrelevant information about U.S.
persons, defined as U.S. citizens and lawful permanent residents.16
The FISC can review these and other materials to determine
whether the government has complied with the statute, although
the FISC does not need to approve individual targets selected by
the government.17 Under the law as of April 6, 2015, the FISC’s
review of § 702 procedures was ex parte.18 The FISC, in other
words, reviewed the government’s certification on its own, without
hearing from individuals or entities who might be subject to
collection or surveillance, or any other source that might provide a
counterweight to the government’s submissions.19
Under § 702, foreign intelligence information that the
government may acquire includes data related to national security,
such as information concerning an “actual or potential attack” or
“other grave hostile acts [by a] foreign power or an agent of a
foreign power.”20 Foreign intelligence information also comprises
information relating to possible sabotage21 and clandestine foreign

piece. See Margulies, The NSA in Global Perspective, supra note 1, at 2140–41
(discussing the domestic surveillance programs exposed in the Snowden
disclosures).
16. See 50 U.S.C. § 1881a (detailing procedures for targeting certain persons
outside the United States other than U.S. persons).
17. See PRESIDENT’S REVIEW GROUP ON INTELLIGENCE AND COMMUNICATIONS
TECHNOLOGIES, LIBERTY AND SECURITY IN A CHANGING WORLD 135 (2013),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2013-12-12_
rg_final_report.pdf (explaining when the government need not obtain an
individual warrant from the FISC). The lack of a requirement for FISC approval
of individual targeting choices under § 702 stems from the constitutional status
of foreign surveillance and the path to enactment of § 702. The Supreme Court
held in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez that non-U.S. persons (defined as those
not citizens, lawful permanent residents, or located in the territorial United
States) do not enjoy the protections of the Fourth Amendment. 494 U.S. 259, 265
(1990); cf. Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and the Global Internet, 67 STAN.
L. REV. 285, 291–94 (2015) (discussing reasons for not extending Fourth
Amendment protections to communications between non-U.S. persons abroad).
18. See 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(k)(2) (2012) (explaining review procedures).
19. Id.
20. Id. § 1801(e)(1)(A).
21. Id. § 1801(e)(1)(B).
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“intelligence activities.”22 Another prong of the definition
encompasses information “with respect to a foreign power or
foreign territory”23 relating to the “the conduct of the foreign affairs
of the United States.”24
B. Post-Snowden Internal Reforms
Since Snowden’s disclosures, NSA officials have been key
participants in an extended conversation about intelligence
collection and surveillance. That conversation has involved
engagement with privacy advocates. It has also involved internal
deliberations. In the second half of 2014, the intelligence
community and privacy advocates coalesced around a collection of
reforms. However, the intelligence community and privacy
advocates continue to disagree on the definition of “foreign
intelligence information” under § 702, particularly the “foreign
affairs” provision. This section describes a number of steps that the
intelligence community has taken to promote transparency and
protect Americans’ privacy. It then discusses privacy advocates’
continued critique of the “foreign affairs” prong of § 702.
In January of 2014, President Obama made a speech that
emphasized that individuals around the world had an interest in
the privacy of their communications vis-à-vis the federal
government. To protect this interest, President Obama made a
number of commitments about U.S. signals-intelligence collection
and surveillance. For example, with respect to the international
bulk (untargeted) collection of signals intelligence, including
content information from phone calls and emails, President Obama
narrowed U.S. efforts to “information relating to the capabilities,
intentions, or activities of foreign governments or elements
thereof, foreign organizations, foreign persons, or international
terrorists.”25 In addition, he asserted that the NSA would engage
in bulk collection of communications only for purposes of “detecting
and countering” terrorism, espionage, nuclear proliferation,
threats to U.S. forces, and financial crimes, including evasion of
22.
23.
24.
25.

Id. § 1801(e)(1)(C).
Id. § 1801(e)(2).
Id. § 1801(e)(2)(B).
PPD-28, supra note 11, at 2 n.2.
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duly enacted sanctions.26 President Obama also clarified what the
United States would not do in bulk collection. First, it would not
collect communications content “for the purpose of suppressing or
burdening criticism or dissent, or for disadvantaging persons
based on their ethnicity, race, gender, sexual orientation, or
religion.”27 Second, it would only disseminate and store
information for any person when Section 2.3 of Executive Order
12,333 permitted such activity for U.S. persons: in cases involving
“foreign intelligence or counterintelligence,” public safety, or
ascertainment of a potential intelligence source’s credibility.28
While § 702 constitutes targeted collection using specific
identifiers, not “bulk” collection, President Obama’s directive also
affected § 702, because PPD-28 initiated a broad intragovernment
process on all intelligence collection abroad.29 This process
centered on ways in which surveillance and espionage could
proceed with maximum feasible respect for the privacy rights of
the world’s citizens.30 Moreover, representatives of each
intelligence-collection agency spoke widely before a spectrum of
stakeholders, including advocacy groups, journalists, scholars, and
practitioners, articulating the IC’s policies and getting feedback
from their interlocutors.31 In addition, agencies engaged in
intelligence collection shared information with the Privacy and
Civil Liberties Oversight Board (PCLOB), which had access to topsecret information in assessing both the USA Patriot Act § 215
“metadata” program and the FISA § 702 program.

26. Id. at 4.
27. Id. at 3.
28. Id. at 6; Exec. Order No. 12,333, 3 C.F.R. 200 (1981), reprinted in 50
U.S.C. § 401 (1982).
29. See PPD-28, supra note 11, at 1–3 (providing principles governing the
collection of signals intelligence).
30. See id. at 5 (“All persons should be treated with dignity and respect,
regardless of their nationality or where they might reside, and all persons have
legitimate privacy interests in the handling of their personal information.”).
31. See, e.g., AM. BAR. ASS’N STANDING COMM. ON L. & NAT’L SEC., 24TH ANN.
REV. OF FIELD OF NAT’L SEC. L. (2014), http://www.americanbar.org/content/
dam/aba/events/law_national_security/LW1114_prog.authcheckdam.pdf (listing
panel including Robert Litt, General Counsel, Office of the Director of Nat’l
Intelligence, as well as law professors and privacy advocate from American Civil
Liberties Union).
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The NSA, for example, drafted a lengthy memo on procedures
required under Section 4 of PPD-28.32 The new procedures
implemented by the NSA are consistent with PPD-28 in that they
“implement the privacy and civil liberties protections afforded to
non-U.S. persons in a manner that is comparable, to the extent
consistent with national security, to the privacy protections
afforded to U.S. persons.”33 The Supplemental Procedures (SPs)
state that “[p]rivacy and civil liberties shall be integral
considerations in the planning of . . . SIGINT activities.”34 The SPs
reiterate that the IC will not engage in collection “for the purpose
of suppressing or burdening criticism or dissent, or for
disadvantaging persons based on their ethnicity, race, color,
gender, sexual orientation, or religion.”35 Importantly, the NSA
has accepted that “personal information” has the same definition
for both U.S. and non-U.S. persons.36
The NSA procedures also contain useful guidance on electronic
search procedures. Here, a primary concern is with tailoring
search terms to avoid unduly broad collection. The NSA addressed
this concern by instructing its analysts that, “[w]herever
practicable,” the agency will use “selection terms” for searches with
a reasonable degree of specificity.37 For example, the NSA will,
when practicable, hone in on “specific foreign intelligence targets,”
such as specific international terrorists or terrorist groups, or
specific topics, such as nuclear weapons proliferation.38
Minimization procedures that limit use and distribution of the
information acquired will also govern analysts’ conduct.39
In the course of its PPD-28 review, the NSA identified and
addressed the special problems of intelligence collected in bulk.
Bulk collection is the collection that can have the broadest impact
on privacy protections worldwide because it refers to signals
32. See NAT’L SEC. AGENCY, PPD-28 SECTION 4 PROCEDURES (2015),
[hereinafter NSA § 4 Memo] (providing the supplemental procedures required by
PPD-28).
33. Id. at 1.
34. Id. at 5 (emphasis added).
35. Id.
36. Id. at 6.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. See id. at 7 (detailing process for handling collections).
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intelligence data that, because of technological challenges or
operational imperatives, is initially acquired in a wholesale
manner. For example, suppose that the United States collected the
content of all communications within a given country (say,
Afghanistan). That wholesale collection would be called “bulk”
collection because collection was done without specific selection
terms.40 The NSA limited itself to using such bulk content
collection for the purpose of identifying and addressing espionage
and other threats from foreign powers, international terrorism,
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), cybersecurity
threats, threats to United States or allied armed forces, and
“[t]ransnational criminal threats,” including “illicit finance” and
evasion of sanctions.41
On retention of information, the NSA’s guidelines provide for
retention for up to five years.42 The NSA’s procedures also limit the
dissemination of personal information to information that, if
private, is related to an authorized “foreign intelligence
requirement,” is “related to a crime,” or demonstrates a “possible
threat to the safety of any person or organization.”43 To enforce
these procedures, the NSA relies on an Inspector General, an
executive branch official who regularly issues reports and testifies
before Congress, the NSA General Counsel, and the NSA/CSS Civil
Liberties and Privacy Director.44 The NSA also has a Compliance
Director who provides advice regarding compliance to agency
personnel.45
40. See id. at 7 n.1 (defining bulk collection).
41. Id. at 7–8. Content information is collected in bulk abroad pursuant to
Executive Order 12,333. Exec. Order 12,333, supra note 28.
42. NSA § 4 Memo, supra note 32, at 8.
43. Id. at 9.
44. See id. at 10 (explaining responsibilities of the Inspector General). For a
candid discussion featuring Rebecca Richards, NSA’s current Civil Liberties and
Privacy Director, see Steptoe Cyber Law Podcast, Episode # 52: An Interview with
Rebecca Richards (Feb. 3, 2015), http://www.lawfareblog.com/steptoe-cyberlawpodcast-episode-52-interview-rebecca-richards [hereinafter Richards].
45. NSA § 4 Memo, supra note 32, at 11. For an argument that the NSA has
unduly formalized legal compliance, instead of encouraging its analysts to
internalize norms, see Margo Schlanger, Intelligence Legalism and the National
Security Agency’s Civil Liberties Gap, 6 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 112 (2015). But see
Richards, supra note 44 (describing interactive and iterative process including
NSA compliance officials and analysts).
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The intelligence community has also made decisive moves
toward public transparency, a necessary step for dialogue. For
example, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI)
has published a trove of FISC opinions, which lay out the
groundwork for collection programs such as § 215 and § 702. In
some cases, the analysis in the FISC opinions has been slender and
conclusory; by disclosing the opinions, ODNI has left itself open to
these criticisms and helped galvanize reform efforts. The ODNI
has also disclosed internal reports that discuss the implementation
of these programs and the efforts made to protect U.S. persons’
private information.46 Moreover, demonstrating that it takes
transparency seriously, the ODNI has released an extraordinary
document, Principles of Intelligence Transparency for the
Intelligence Community,47 which articulates a number of guiding
norms, including noting that agencies should be “proactive and
clear in making information publicly available through authorized
channels,” including “provid[ing] timely transparency on matters
of public interest,” “prepar[ing] information with sufficient clarity
and context, so that it is readily understandable,” and “classify[ing]
only that information which, if disclosed without authorization,
could be expected to cause identifiable or describable damage to
the national security.”48 In addition, the transparency principles
provide a middle course between absolute classification of a given
document and wholesale disclosure, reminding officials that they
can use “portion marking” to reveal certain content within a
document, while keeping the rest secret.49
While the transparency principles may not be fulfilled one
hundred percent of the time, they are valuable because they
provide a neutral index of best practices. A range of stakeholders
can use this index, from agency officials predisposed toward
46. See NAT’L SEC. AGENCY, NSA DIRECTOR OF CIVIL LIBERTIES AND PRIVACY
OFFICE REPORT: NSA’S IMPLEMENTATION OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE
ACT SECTION 702 (2014), https://www.nsa.gov/civil_liberties/_files/nsa_report_on_
section_702_program.pdf (discussing the implementation of Section 702).
47. OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF NAT’L INTELLIGENCE, PRINCIPLES OF INTELLIGENCE
TRANSPARENCY FOR THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY (2015), http://www.dni.gov/
files/documents/ppd-28/FINAL%20Transparency_poster%20 v1.pdf.
48. Id.
49. See id. (describing the use of portion marking and similar means to
distinguish classified and unclassified information).
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transparency to outside advocates seeking to hold the agency’s feet
to the fire. Each group is empowered because the IC has gone “on
the record” as supporting these principles. The IC may still err on
the side of over-classification. In addition, outsiders still face
significant impediments in gauging the extent of overclassification, since outside advocates, to paraphrase Donald
Rumsfeld, “don’t know what they don’t know.”50 However, the
transparency principles at least shift the conversation several
notches toward disclosure, and provide a readily accessible source
of authority for those seeking to promote greater openness.
The United States is not the only country that has gestured in
the direction of new governance after the Snowden revelations.
Britain’s Investigatory Powers Tribunal (IPT) recently noted that
Britain had violated provisions of the European Convention on
Human Rights prior to the Snowden disclosures.51 However, the
IPT recently concluded, the legal and operational “regime” followed
by Britain’s intelligence and surveillance agency, GCHQ,
regarding the “soliciting, receiving, storing and transmitting” of
communications of individuals in Britain was now consistent with
the European Convention.52 The only reasonable inference is that
GCHQ “cleaned up its act” at least to some degree because of its
response to Snowden’s actions.53
Privacy groups in the United States have continued to seek
substantive reform. While the USA FREEDOM Act included some
reforms, the privacy community continued to express concern
about the scope of § 702. In particular, privacy advocates
questioned the provision of § 702 that authorized targeted
collection of information “with respect to a foreign power or foreign
territory” relating to the “the conduct of the foreign affairs of the

50. See Pozen, supra note 4, at 259–60 (discussing Rumsfeld’s quote).
51. See Liberty & Others v. Sec’y of State, UKIPTrib 13 77-H (Feb. 6, 2015),
available
at
http://www.ipt-uk.com/docs/Liberty_Ors_Judgment_6Feb15.pdf
(discussing disclosure of the Prism and Upstream programs).
52. See id. ¶ 23 (“[T]he regime governing the soliciting, receiving, storing and
transmitting by UK authorities . . . contravened Articles 8 or 10 ECHR, but now
complies.”).
53. Britain has since enacted a more restrictive surveillance law, but a
British court has held that the new law conflicts with European privacy
regulations. Davis v. Home Sec’y, No. CO/3365/2014, [2015] EWHC 2092, ¶ 91(c)
(Royal Ct. Justice London Div. 2015).
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United States.”54 According to privacy advocates, this formulation
was overbroad. As a result, U.S. intelligence collection could cover
virtually any person, blurring the distinction between bulk and
targeted collection.55 While the privacy advocates’ concerns are not
wholly without basis, they have paid insufficient heed to the
possibility of a narrower definition that centers on U.S. diplomacy
and the protection of specific U.S. interests, such as the protection
of U.S. intellectual property from theft by foreign powers or
non-U.S. persons located outside the United States. Later in this
Article, I will explain why greater specificity about these activities
would interfere with legitimate U.S. diplomatic goals. To provide a
basis for that discussion, the next subsection examines the
Framers’ attitudes on secrecy and diplomacy.
II. The Framers and the Utility of Secrecy in Statecraft
While the Framers generally believed in the virtues of
transparency, they tempered the belief with a cogent awareness of
secrecy’s utility.56 As Washington observed during the
Revolutionary War, gathering information in war (and arguably
other dealings with foreign states) often required secrecy, which
could determine the success of particular operations.57 The
54. 50 U.S.C. § 1801(e)(2)(B) (2012).
55. There is no legislative history on point. The analysis in the text also
assumes that in the subsection’s wording, the indefinite article, “a,” preceding
“foreign power” also modifies “foreign territory.” In other words, the subsection
authorizes only collection regarding a specific unit of land that is controlled by a
foreign power, or is legally under the administration of a foreign power, but as a
practical matter is not controlled by that power (this might describe certain
activities within “failed” or “failing” states such as Yemen). Although one could
also read the subsection as authorizing any collection on any territory that was
not part of the United States, that broader definition would render the preceding
statutory term, “foreign power,” superfluous. Courts generally disfavor
superfluity in statutory interpretation.
56. See Margulies, Dynamic Surveillance, supra note 1, at 30–33 (discussing
secrecy in American law). Alexander Hamilton, for example, praised the office of
the presidency as the Framers had conceived it, highlighting the virtues of
decisiveness, efficiency, and secrecy. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 70, at 424
(Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (“Decision, activity, secrecy,
and dispatch will generally characterize the proceedings of one man in a much
more eminent degree than the proceedings of any greater number . . . .”).
57. See Letter from George Washington to Col. Elias Dayton (July 26, 1777),
in 8 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON FROM THE ORIGINAL MANUSCRIPT
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Framers also understood that secrecy could enhance deliberation
by expanding choices for decision makers. Premature disclosure of
certain controversial options could compromise those options’
effectiveness, effectively taking options off the table.58 That
narrowing of choices did not merely affect the officials themselves;
it affected the public that officials served. Illustrating the Framers’
views, they ensured the secrecy of the deliberations that informed
the Constitution’s drafting, which were kept under wraps for thirty
years.59
Consider a formative episode in both U.S. legal and political
history: the crisis in relations with France surrounding President
Washington’s Neutrality Proclamation of 1793.60 In the
Proclamation, President Washington interpreted a treaty between
France and the United States as permitting the United States to
remain neutral in the war between Britain and France, even
though the treaty appeared to require that each party aid the other
in wartime.61 Alexander Hamilton’s famed defense of the
SOURCES (John C. Fitzpatrick ed., 1931–1944), available at http://web.archive.
org/web/20110219010057/http://etext.lib.virginia.edu/etcbin/toccer-new2?id=Was
Fi08.xml&images=images/modeng&data=/texts/english/modeng/parsed&tag=pu
blic&part=397&division=div1 (stressing the importance of secrecy in gathering
intelligence); see also Cent. Intelligence Agency v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159, 172 n.16
(1985) (quoting Washington’s order to a subordinate as support for fashioning
exemption to Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) about certain controversial
domestic research activities funded by Central Intelligence Agency).
58. See RAHUL SAGAR, SECRETS AND LEAKS: THE DILEMMA OF STATE SECRECY
2 (2013) (“[C]itizens may themselves prefer secrecy when it leads to the execution
of worthy policies that cannot otherwise be carried out.”); Dennis F. Thompson,
Democratic Secrecy, 114(2) POL. SCI. Q. 181, 182 (1999) (asserting that without
secrecy, some policies “to which citizens would consent if they had the
opportunity . . . could not be carried out as effectively or at all”); see also SISSELA
BOK, LYING: MORAL CHOICE IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LIFE 176 (1978) (conceding that
concealing a controversial diplomatic mission and even issuing a “cover story” to
cover diplomat’s tracks could be a permissible “white lie,” but urging that such
tactics should be reduced to “an absolute minimum”).
59. Max Farrand, Introduction to 1 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION
OF 1787, at xi–xii (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1966).
60. George Washington, The Proclamation of Neutrality 1793, available at
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/neutra93.asp.
61.
See ELKINS & MCKITRICK, supra note 5, at 332–53 (describing
neutrality crisis); MICHAEL D. RAMSEY, THE CONSTITUTION’S TEXT IN FOREIGN
AFFAIRS 78–80 (2007) (explaining the circumstances surrounding Washington’s
neutrality proclamation); Martin Flaherty, The Story of the Neutrality
Controversy: Struggling Over Presidential Power Outside the Courts, in
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Proclamation, although it does not encompass secrecy per se,
illustrates the President’s ability to manage the interaction of
public deliberation and strategic advantage.62 The strategic
benefits that neutrality provided to the United States were evident
to all. War with Britain, Hamilton opined, would be “most
dangerous,”63 since the new republic’s military assets were
inadequate for fending off Britain’s might.64 Although the
Democratic Republican faction led by then Secretary of State
Thomas Jefferson opposed Hamilton, both factions wished to avoid
U.S. entanglement in a European war, given the weakness of the
U.S. military.”65 The President, according to Hamilton, therefore,
could read the treaty as foregoing futile measures that would
deplete and perhaps destroy the fragile new republic.
The political and diplomatic dynamics of the Neutrality
Proclamation also illustrate the importance attached to secrecy by
the officials of the Founding Era. The crisis precipitating the
Proclamation arose because of the insistent public posturing of the
French Minister to America, Edmond Genet. Seeking an alliance
with the United States against Britain, Genet publicly called out
Washington and his cabinet. Seeking to mobilize the American
public to commission privateers that would prey on British
shipping, Genet denounced the “ancient politics” of “diplomatic
subtleties.”66 Genet’s direct communication with the American
PRESIDENTIAL POWER STORIES 21 (Curtis A. Bradley and Christopher H.
Schroeder, eds., 2008) (examining the constitutional issues presented by the
neutrality proclamation and surrounding controversy).
62. See Alexander Hamilton, Pacificus No. I (1793), reprinted in LETTERS OF
PACIFICUS AND HELVIDIUS ON THE PROCLAMATION OF PRESIDENT WASHINGTON 6, 11
(1845) [hereinafter Pacificus Letters], available at https://archive.org/
details/lettersofpacific00hami (discussing the executive power of the president).
63. Id. at 46.
64. Id. at 43.
65. Hamilton asserted flatly that the United States was incapable of
“external efforts which could materially serve the cause of France.” Id. at 43.
Jefferson condemned efforts by the French to inspire Ameriscans to join the fight
against Britain, cautioning that the actions of U.S. citizens who “commit murders
and depredations on the members of nations at peace with us . . . [were] as much
against the law of the land” as Americans who would murder or rob other United
States citizens. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Edmond C. Genet (June 17,
1793) in 9 WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 131, 136 (Andrew A. Lipscomb ed.,
1903).
66. ELKINS & MCKITRICK, supra note 5, at 348.
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public and his contempt for the secrecy that facilitates diplomatic
exchanges enraged Washington, who bridled at Genet’s public
“defiance” of the U.S. government’s wishes and the French
minister’s recklessness in “threaten[ing] the Executive with an
appeal to the People.”67 Genet’s bent for public appeals also
alienated both Jefferson and Hamilton, who agreed on little else.68
In a letter to future president James Monroe, Jefferson noted that
he was desperately trying to tame Genet’s “impetuosity,” and cure
Genet of the “dangerous” view that the people of the US will
disavow the acts of their government, and that [Genet] has an
appeal from the Executive to Congress.”69 Jefferson also deplored
Genet’s disregard for secrecy and tact in correspondence with
James Madison, describing Genet as “disrespectful and even
indecent” towards President Washington. Here, too, Jefferson
singled out for special ire Genet’s penchant for communicating
directly with the U.S. Congress and the public, which Jefferson
predicted would lead to “universal indignation.”70
Even more importantly for our present discussion, Genet’s
public appeals also threatened the interests of France in a
productive relationship with the United States. Jefferson, who
wished to help France to the extent possible, felt far more
threatened than Hamilton by Genet’s choice of methods.71
Hamilton viewed Genet’s public posturing as of a piece with the
anarchic approach he feared from the ever-changing custodians of
the French Revolution.72 Because Hamilton wished to discredit
France, Genet’s public confrontation with Washington served his

67. Id. at 351.
68. Id. at 348–51.
69. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Monroe (June 28, 1793),
reprinted in THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON DIGITAL EDITION (Barbara B.
Oberg & J. Jefferson Looney eds., 2008–2015), available at http://rotunda.
upress.virginia.edu/founders/TSJN-01-26-02-0358.
70. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (July 7, 1793), in THE
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON DIGITAL EDITION (Barbara B. Oberg & J. Jefferson
Looney eds., 2008–2015), available at http://rotunda.upress.virginia.edu/
founders/ TSJN-01-26-02-0391.
71. See HARPER, supra note 5, at 116–18 (explaining Jefferson’s interactions
with Genet during the neutrality dilemma).
72. See ELKINS & MCKITRICK, supra note 5, at 355, 361 (discussing
Hamilton’s role).
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interests by making any aid to France suspect.73 Jefferson, on the
other hand, wished to preserve the possibility of some aid to
France,74 as did Genet’s superiors in Paris.75 The blowback from
Genet’s public confrontation with the U.S. government threatened
to eliminate this option.76 In other words, the Neutrality Crisis,
which resulted in both the Proclamation and Genet’s ultimate
recall, demonstrated that most central players of the Founding Era
viewed secrecy as essential to the cultivation of options in
diplomacy and foreign affairs.
Developing the Framers’ insight, the Supreme Court has long
recognized that secrecy can be necessary for the preservation of
options. In Totten v. United States,77 the Court invoked what later
came to be known as the state secrets doctrine78 to support
requiring dismissal of a lawsuit seeking payment for services
allegedly provided by a clandestine Union operative during the
Civil War. The Court noted the need for secrecy in both war and
foreign relations.79 Writing for the Court, Justice Field cautioned
that litigation of disputes over the terms of secret missions could
expose sensitive dealings “to the serious detriment of the public.”80
Detriment would result not merely from disclosure of covert
sources and methods, but from a narrowing of the government’s
choices.81 For analogous reasons, courts have shielded intrabranch advice that aids the President’s deliberations.82
73. Id. at 360–61.
74. Id. at 357.
75. Id. at 366–67.
76. Id. at 357.
77. 92 U.S. 105 (1876).
78. See generally Robert M. Chesney, State Secrets and the Limits of
National Security Litigation, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1249 (2007) (analyzing the
state secrets doctrine).
79. See Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105, 106 (1876) (noting that the
doctrine would be relevant in any case concerning “secret employments of the
government in time of war, or . . . matters affecting our foreign relations, where a
disclosure of the service might compromise or embarrass our government in its
public duties . . . .”).
80. Id. at 106–07.
81. See id. (warning that the prospect of litigation could make clandestine
operations “impossible” to attempt). See generally Tenet v. Doe, 544 U.S. 1 (2005)
(reaffirming state secrets doctrine).
82. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 715 (1974) (“The need for
confidentiality even as to idle conversations with associates in which casual
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III. Post-Snowden Reforms and the Abiding Importance of Secrecy
Privacy advocates critiquing U.S. surveillance in the wake of
Edward Snowden’s revelations have not acknowledged the
Framers’ theory and practice of secrecy. They have targeted § 702’s
foreign affairs provision, characterizing it as a catch-all provision
that licenses wholesale government intrusions.83 This view unduly
discounts the foreign affairs provision’s text, nature, and purpose.
Substantive critiques of the foreign affairs provision have not
informed public debate; they have distorted it. On the other hand,
arguing for a robust public advocate at the FISC and other
procedural proxies for substantive changes to the foreign affairs
provision can turn the post-Snowden conversation toward
productive goals.
A. Reading and Misreading § 702’s Foreign Affairs Provision
The foreign affairs prong of § 702, read in its entirety, has a
narrow
and
entirely
legitimate
purpose.
Narrowing
information-gathering to data “with respect to a foreign power”
clearly signals that collection will focus on activities of foreign
governments. That activity might include receipt of bribes,84 trade,
foreign-owned industries, or foreign officials’ views on matters
relating to the enumerated factors, such as sanctions evasion or
WMDs. James Dempsey, a member of the Privacy and Civil
Liberties Oversight Board (PCLOB) with a background as a
distinguished privacy advocate85 informed by access in his PCLOB
reference might be made concerning political leaders within the country or foreign
statesmen is too obvious to call for further treatment.”).
83. See PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BD., PUBLIC HEARING
REGARDING THE SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM OPERATED PURSUANT TO SECTION 702 OF
THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT 285–86 (Mar. 19, 2014)
[hereinafter PCLOB § 702 Hearing] (response of Laura Pitter) (asserting that
statutory provision for gathering of information regarding “the general foreign
affairs of the United States allows for the collection of a vast amount of
information that does not necessarily have any national security purpose”).
84. See Foreign Press Center Briefing Transcript, James Woolsey, Former
Director, Central Intelligence Agency, Intelligence Gathering and Democracies:
The Issue of Economic and Industrial Espionage (Mar. 7, 2000), available at
http://fas.org/irp/news/2000/03/wool0300.htm.
85. Cf. James X. Dempsey & Lara M. Flint, Commercial Data and National

DEFINING “FOREIGN AFFAIRS”

1301

role to information about § 702, articulated this narrow mission
well. At a 2014 hearing, Dempsey observed that the provision
authorized collection about the “intent of foreign governments.”86
Moreover, Dempsey observed, foreign governments also constantly
seek to learn “what their adversaries are doing.”87 That would
make unilateral restraint by the United States unwise. In
addition, provisions of international law on privacy should be read
against that backdrop of consistent state practice.88
Unfortunately for the merits of public debate, surveillance
critics have failed to acknowledge these limits in the statute or the
importance of intelligence collection supporting U.S. diplomatic
efforts.89 The privacy advocates’ failure to acknowledge the nature
and purpose of § 702’s “foreign affairs” provision has real costs. A
more concrete discussion urged by privacy advocates of U.S. efforts
to acquire information “with respect to a foreign power” would
entail disclosure of U.S. spying on other countries. This spying is
Security, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1459, 1466–67 (2004) (cautioning about adverse
privacy effects of government data mining of domestic business records).
86. PCLOB § 702 Hearing, supra note 83, at 286.
87. Id. Dempsey’s observation echoed James Madison. See THE FEDERALIST
NO. 41, at 257–58 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (warning that,
because the Constitution could not “chain the ambition or set bounds to the
exertions of all other nations,” it should not be read as needlessly curbing U.S.
officials’ discretion regarding national security).
88. PCLOB § 702 Hearing, supra note 83, at 286. On one occasion, the
International Court of Justice has issued preliminary relief barring one state from
conducting surveillance on officials of another state. See generally Questions
Relating to the Seizure and Detention of Certain Documents and Data (TimorLeste v. Australia), 2014 I.C.J. 156 (Mar. 3). However, that decision involved the
narrow issue of ensuring the integrity of arbitral proceedings involving the two
countries. See id. ¶ 42 (asserting that the right of a state to engage in arbitration
would “suffer irreparable harm” if the state conducting such surveillance used the
information acquired to gain an advantage).
89. See Jennifer Granick, Reforming The Section 702 Dragnet (Part I), JUST
SECURITY (Jan. 30, 2014, 5:54 PM), http://justsecurity.org/6574/reforming-section702-dragnet-1/ (last visited Aug. 30, 2015) (critiquing surveillance practices) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Harley Geiger, Four Key Reforms
for NSA Surveillance, CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY AND TECH. (Mar. 14, 2014),
https://cdt.org/blog/four-key-reforms-for-nsa-surveillance/ (last visited Aug. 30,
2015) (proposing surveillance reforms) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review); Elizabeth Gotein & Faiza Patel, Brennan Center for Justice, What Went
Wrong With the FISA Court 27 (Mar. 18, 2015), available at https://www.
brennancenter.org/publication/what-went-wrong-fisa-court
(critiquing
the
“foreign affairs” provision).

1302

72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1283 (2015)

often entirely legal under both domestic and international law.90
However, as the Framers recognized during the Neutrality Crisis,
public disclosure will inevitably impede such activities and the
diplomacy they support, thus narrowing the range of permissible
deliberation.
Openly acknowledging such efforts would complicate U.S.
diplomatic efforts in obvious ways. Suppose that the U.S. needed
the support of foreign officials to enforce sanctions against Iran or
North Korea. However, suppose that the U.S. was also collecting
information about how officials in those countries took bribes from
either U.S. companies or international firms. If U.S. officials
disclosed this intelligence collection, foreign officials might be far
less willing to aid the U.S. on sanctions issues.91
Moreover, domestic critics of surveillance fail to realize that
diplomacy is often a two-level game.92 Some foreign leaders might
wish to tolerate U.S. surveillance, recognizing that espionage is an
activity in which many countries participate. That sense of
reciprocity on the utility of espionage has helped crystallize the
consensus that espionage does not violate international law.93
However, other factions in those countries might push their
leaders to take a more robust stance against U.S. efforts. An
accurate reckoning of disclosure’s costs must include the influence
90. See Deeks, supra note 1, at 302–13 (analyzing international law on
surveillance); Jordan J. Paust, Can You Hear Me Now? Private Communication,
National Security, and the Human Rights Disconnect, 15 CHI. J. INT’L L. 612, 647
(2015) (stating that “widely practiced espionage regarding foreign state secrets is
not a violation of international law”).
91. Jack Goldsmith has written insightfully about the nature of U.S.
intelligence-gathering, although Professor Goldsmith apparently does not share
my view that more candid conversation about U.S. efforts would be problematic
for diplomacy. See Jack Goldsmith, The Precise (and Narrow) Limits on U.S.
Economic Espionage, LAWFARE (Mar. 23, 2105, 7:09 AM), http://www.lawfare
blog.com/2015/03/the-precise-and-narrow-limits-on-u-s-economic-espionage/ (last
visited July 5, 2015) (discussing economic espionage) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
92. See Robert D. Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of
Two-Level Games, 42 INT’L ORG. 427, 436 (1988) (critiquing intelligence practices).
93. See Richard R. Baxter, So-Called ‘Unprivileged Belligerency’: Spies,
Guerillas, and Saboteurs, 28 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 323, 328–29 (1951) (doubting that
espionage is a violation of the law of nations); cf. John C. Dehn, The Hamdan Case
and the Application of a Municipal Offence: The Common Law Origins of ‘Murder
in Violation of the Law of War’, 7 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 63, 73–79 (2009) (analyzing
Baxter’s view).
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of those factions on foreign leaders. Failure to acknowledge this
two-level dynamic detracts from the merits of arguments made by
U.S. critics of surveillance policy.
Part of the problem with the conversation about surveillance
policy is an asymmetry in the incentives of the conversation’s
participants.94 Domestic critics of surveillance policy have no
incentive to acknowledge the complex world that makes
surveillance necessary. Instead, critics are largely free to “play to
their base,” mobilizing adherents and financial support through
untempered criticism. On the other hand, a diligent government
official will wish to acknowledge the legitimate concerns of critics
but will also need to protect U.S. interests. However, protecting
those interests may limit the disclosures that U.S. officials can
make. The asymmetric incentives that favor surveillance critics
make the overall conversation less nuanced than it should be.95
B. A Way Forward to a More Productive Conversation: Procedural
Proxies
Conscientious critics of surveillance policy may tacitly
acknowledge the above critique, because, while not abandoning
substantive critique, they have pushed for what I call procedural
proxies for substantive reform.96 This section first explains this
term and then discusses specific procedural proxies in the
surveillance context.
Procedural proxies are process-based protections that ensure
disinterested deliberation. The best example in U.S. law is the

94. See JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY: LAW AND JUDGMENT
INSIDE THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION 60 (2007) (critiquing the incentive structure of
NGOs); Kenneth Anderson, “Accountability” as “Legitimacy”: Global Governance,
Global Civil Society and the United Nations, 36 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 841, 842–44
(2011) (same).
95. Surveillance critics’ sincerity is clear. However, critics’ incentive
structure gives them little or no reason to temper their arguments. That ability
to be “temperate and cool” was a virtue the Framers prized. THE FEDERALIST NO.
3, at 41–45 (John Jay) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
96. I have developed this analysis elsewhere. See Margulies, Dynamic
Surveillance, supra note 1, at 51–62 (analyzing potential reforms); Margulies,
NSA in Global Perspective, supra note 1, at 2165–66 (same); cf. Deeks, supra note
1, at 343–67 (noting the importance of procedural constraints).
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Fourth Amendment’s requirement of a neutral magistrate.97
Without a neutral magistrate, the scope of criminal law might
allow the executive branch to be the judge in its own case,
permitting targeting of political opponents and the resulting
impact on First Amendment rights. A neutral magistrate does not
erase this problem, but it does mitigate it. Similarly, procedural
reforms in §§ 215 and 702 serve as a proxy—the government will
be less likely to target political opponents at home or abroad if it
knows someone is watching.98
One procedural proxy is an institutionalized public advocate
at the FISC.99 The public advocate would play a role in FISC
proceedings, weighing in on legal issues and perhaps on the factual
sufficiency of government surveillance requests. The USA
Freedom Act firmed up this option.100 An institutionalized
advocate would go further, because its role would not be contingent
on a request from the FISC, which has been somewhat wary of
participation in proceedings that historically have been ex parte.101
97. See United States v. U.S. District Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 316–17
(1972) (interpreting the Fourth Amendment’s neutral magistrate requirement).
98. See BENJAMIN WITTES & GABRIELA BLUM, THE FUTURE OF VIOLENCE:
ROBOTS AND GERMS, HACKERS AND DRONES 200–01 (2015) (acknowledging the
hypothetical risk that U.S. surveillance could target disfavored groups but
suggesting that sound safeguards have vastly reduced this risk).
99. See Margulies, Dynamic Surveillance, supra note 1, at 51–61 (evaluating
Special Advocate proposal); Marty Lederman & Steve Vladeck, The
Constitutionality of a FISA “Special Advocate,” JUST SECURITY (Nov. 4, 2013, 1:34
PM), https://www.justsecurity.org/2873/fisa-special-advocate-constitution/ (last
visited Aug. 30, 2015) (analyzing the Special Advocate proposal) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
100. See generally 50 U.S.C. § 1803(i).
101. See Letter, Hon. John D. Bates, Director, Admin. Office of the U.S.
Courts, to Hon. Dianne Feinstein, Chairman, U.S. Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence
2
(Jan.
13,
2014),
http://www.lawfareblog.com/wpcontent/uploads/2014/01/1-13-2014-Ltr-to-DFeinstein-re-FISA.pdf
(discussing
problems with privacy advocates); Comments of the Judiciary on Proposals
Regarding the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 3–4 (Jan. 10, 2014),
http://www.lawfareblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/1-10-2014-Enclosurere-FISA.pdf (commenting on reform proposals). But see Steve Vladeck, Judge
Bates and a FISA “Special Advocate,” LAWFARE (Feb. 4, 2014, 9:24 AM),
http://www.lawfareblog.com/2014/02/judge-bates-and-a-fisa-special-advocate/
(last visited Aug. 30, 2015) (arguing that criticism of the Special Advocate
proposal is misplaced because an advocate would only participate in the cases
involving substantial legal issues, would not impede FISC proceedings, and “even
the finest jurists can occasionally benefit from exposure to . . . arguments that
they might not have known to ask for”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
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On balance, as I and others have written, the objections to the
public advocate based on security, efficiency, and constitutionality
are overstated.102 A public advocate would actually increase the
effectiveness of surveillance programs, by muting political
opposition that could otherwise result in far more severe curbs.
Along similar lines, Chairperson David Medine of the PCLOB
and PCLOB member and former D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals
Judge Patricia Wald have suggested giving a “special master” at
the FISC the ability to review a sample of FISA requests.103
Sampling could be done by selecting key words or having NSA
computers search for relevant documents. Sampling would provide
a reasonable indication of the kinds of collection that the IC is
engaging in based on the “foreign affairs” prong of § 702. That
random sampling would not expressly preclude or eliminate
potential overbreadth, but it would raise the costs of overbreadth,
making it less likely to occur. Moreover, as Hamilton suggested
with respect to the very institution of judicial review, random
sampling would lead the agencies sampled to develop even more
robust internal privacy cultures104 because such agencies would be
rewarded by less intrusive oversight on contested matters.105
Procedural reforms would also provide greater legitimacy and
credibility for technological safeguards within the intelligence
community. For example, the intelligence community has imposed
search filters that prevent analysts from querying databases with
terms not approved by the FISC.106 The NSA is also developing
Review).
102. See Margulies, Dynamic Surveillance, supra note 1, at 53–61 (evaluating
the Special Advocate proposal); Lederman & Vladeck, supra note 99 (same).
103. See PCLOB § 702 Report, supra note 3, at 157 n.567 (describing the
proposal for a FISC special master).
104. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 470 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton
Rossiter ed., 1961) (discussing the concept of judicial review).
105. See JACK GOLDSMITH, POWER AND CONSTRAINT: THE ACCOUNTABLE
PRESIDENCY AFTER 9/11, at 117–18 (2012) (explaining effect of FOIA rulings on
CIA’s disclosure practices).
106. See OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF NAT’L INTELLIGENCE, SAFEGUARDING THE
PERSONAL INFO. OF ALL PEOPLE: A STATUS REPORT ON THE DEVELOPMENT &
IMPLEMENTATION OF PROCEDURES UNDER PRESIDENTIAL POLICY DIRECTIVE 28, at 7–
8 (2014) (discussing procedures to protect personal information); Margulies,
Dynamic Surveillance, supra note 1, at 43–44 (discussing search protocol
constraints in the Fourth Amendment context); Nathan Alexander Sales, Run for
the Border: Laptop Searches and the Fourth Amendment, 43 U. RICH. L. REV. 1091,
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audit mechanisms that monitor analysts’ compliance with FISC
orders and identify efforts to circumvent legal requirements. A
public advocate should be entitled to access those compliance
records to assess their efficacy.107
IV. Conclusion
While the Snowden revelations have sparked a conversation
about surveillance policy, that conversation has sometimes lacked
nuance. Overly simplistic analysis is a hallmark of discussion of
§ 702’s foreign affairs provision. Critics of surveillance policy have
regarded the provision as a license for indiscriminate content
collection, despite the provision’s roots in legitimate interests of
the United States, such as acquiring information about bribery of
foreign officials or the theft of U.S. intellectual property. Critics’
failure to acknowledge the importance of the foreign affairs
provision would have disturbed the Framers, who understood
secrecy’s utility for statecraft. Procedural proxies, such as a robust
public advocate at the FISC, can put the surveillance conversation
back on track.

1123 (2009) (urging search protocols in laptop searches); Athul K. Acharya, Note,
Semantic Searches, 63 DUKE L.J. 393, 409–23 (2013) (discussing search protocols
in Fourth Amendment cases).
107. A public advocate or other independent entity should also receive
sufficient data about intelligence collection methodology to determine whether
methods used by the United States are accurate and reliable. Cf. Margaret Hu,
Small Data Surveillance v. Big Data Surveillance, 42 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 773,
810–15 (2015) (suggesting application to computerized intelligence collection
techniques of the Daubert test used by courts to assess reliability of scientific
evidence).

